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IV

ARGUMENT
The trial court committed reversible error when it concluded that Appellant's wife
("Mrs. Nordgren") filed a "claim" in the context of U.C.A. §30-2-11(4) when she served
her Notice of Intent to Commence Action pursuant to §78B-3-4-412 ("Notice of Intent");
that Appellant's loss of consortium claim was untimely because he did not file his
Complaint on the same day as the Notice of Intent; and that Appellant's loss of
consortium claim is governed by U.C.A. §78B-4-401, et set. (the "Malpractice Act").
This position is supported by controlling Utah law, including the Utah Supreme' Court's
decision in Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, the decision in Crabtree v. Woodman, 2008
WL 4276957 and the plain langue of U.C.A. §30-2-11 and the Malpractice Act.
Appellees arguments, on the other hand, hinge on the premise that Appellant's loss
of consortium claim is governed by the Malpractice Act and that the Notice of Intent filed
by Mrs. Nordgren constitutes a "claim" under U.C.A. §30-2-11(4).

This position,

however, is not supported by the applicable statutes or Utah case law.
Moreover, Appellees improperly fuse the proceedings in the district court witiht
proceedings of the private arbitration proceeding in which Mrs. Nordgren is pursuing her
disputes against the Appellees. Appellant's loss of consortium action in District Court
was governed by U.C.A. §30-2-11(4). Mrs. Nordgren's arbitration, on the other hand, is
governed by the procedural requirements of the parties' Dispute Resolution Agreement
and the Utah Arbitration Act. Therefore, the analysis of what constitutes a "claim" is
different in this forum than in the arbitration and the two should not be confused.

1
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THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT MRS. NORDGREN FILED A "CLAIM" IN THE
CONTEXT OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-11(4) WHEN SHE SERVED
HER NOTICE OF INTENT TO COMMENCE ACTION.
As Appellant explained in his Brief, the trial court ignored well-established

principles of statutory interpretation of first looking to plain language used by the
Legislature, but also reading the "plain language of the statute as a whole and interpret its
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters.5' LPI
Services v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, TT11, 215 P.3d 13 (citing Savage v. Utah Young VilL,
2004 UT 102, \ 18,104 P.3d 1242). Appellees argue that the trial court's holding
follows the plain language of Section 30-2-1 l(4)(a) and the Malpractice Act. See
Blomquist Appellee Brief at 3. Even a cursory read of both 30-2-1 l(4)(a) and the
Malpractice Act defeats Appellees' conclusion.
Appellant's complaint is based on Utah's loss of consortium statute, Utah Code
Ann. §30-2-11(4), which provides:
A claim for the spouses' loss of consortium shall be:
(a)
Made at the time the claim of the injured person is made and joinder of the
actions shall be compulsory; and
(b)
Subject to the same defenses, limitations, immunities and provisions
applicable to the claims of the injured person.
Section §30-2-1 l(4)(a). The plain language of Section 30-2-1 l(4)(a) reads that a loss of
consortium claim shall be "[m]ade at the time the claim of injured person is made".
However, the terms "at the time" and "claim" are undefined.
Appellees argue that because the trial court concluded that Mrs. Nordgren began
her medical malpractice action June 12, 2007, on the day she served her Notice of Intent,

2

the Malpractice Act should be read in conjunction with §30-2-11(4). (R. at 123.) Again,
the Malpractice Act does not define these terms either. The Malpractice Act does make a
distinction between the Notice of Intent1 and a Malpractice Action2. However, this
distinction is missed by Appellees due to their blanket acceptance of the trial court's
determination that Mrs. Nordgren's Notice of Intent was a "claim" for the purposes of
§30-2-11. (R. at 123-124.)
Appellees further argue that the purposes of the Malpractice Act are frustrated
when a loss of consortium plaintiff fails to give notice of his claims at the time the
medical malpractice plaintiff services her notice of intent. See Blomquist Appellee Brief
at 4. The Appellees reason that the purpose of the Malpractice Act was compromised
when Appellant's Complaint was not filed at the time of the Notice of Intent. This
position is not supported by Utah case law. In fact, this point ignores the Supreme
Court's analysis in Bowling v. Sullen, 2004 UT 50,ffif10-11, 94 P.3d 915, when it
rejected a very similar argument made by Bullen, the health care provider, in that action:
However, the stated purpose of the [Malpractice Act] is to alleviate health care
costs via the establishment of a fixed window of time 'in which actions may be
commenced against health care providers.. .Its purpose is not to confer the benefit
of a shorter statute of limitations upon medical professional whose alleged
transgressions are only tangentially related to their provision of health care
services. Therefore, we cannot conclude that Bullen5 s interpretation of the Act is
consistent with either the plain language or the legislative intent and, in keeping
with our obligation to avoid statutory constructions that 'render some part of a
provision nonsensical or absurd,' we reject [Bullen's] analysis.
Dowlingat\lL
1

U.C.A. § 78B-3-412(l)(emphasis added).

2

Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-403(16)
3

Appellees further argue that failure to accept that the Notice of Intent is a "claim"
would frustrate the purposes of the Malpractice Act. Id. at 4. However, this argument is
just that, pure argument and is not supported by any Utah case law. Had Mrs. Nordgren
not been bound by the Dispute Resolution Agreement, thefilingof the Complaint would
have been the appropriate step to "make her claim". Accordingly, Mrs. Nordgren has not
made a "claim" under the context of §30-2-11(4) thus making it impossible for Appellant
to derive from her Notice of Intent.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT UTAH CODE ANN. §30-2-11(4) REQUIRED
APPELLANT TO FILE HIS LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CLAIM ON THE
SAME DAY HIS WIFE SERVED HER NOTICE OF INTENT TO
COMMMENCE LITIGATION.
Appellees argue that the plain language of §30-2-11(4) required Appellant to make

his loss of consortium claim on the same day that Mrs. Nordgren served her Notice of
Intent on June 12,2007. Blomquist Appellee Brief at 6. However, in response to
Appellant's argument that such a literal interpretation would deprive Appellant of his
opportunity to make his claim and have an absurd result not intended by the legislature,
Appellees now seem to concede that Appellant was not required to file his Complaint on
June 12, 2007. Blomquist Appellee Brief at 6,fn 2. Instead, Appellees argue that
Appellant's Complaint was untimely because he Appellees were prejudiced and forced to
conducted discovery in Mrs. Nordgren's arbitration for fifteen (15) months before
Appellant filed his Complaint. Appellees must begin ignoring the obvious disconnect in
their argument.

4

Appellees assert that the legislature intended §30-2-11(4) to be interpreted broadly
because it choose the phrase "made at the time" when referring to when a spouse of an
injured person shall make his claim. §30-2-11 (4). Appellee Blomquist Brief at 4.
Appellant has been unable to find any legislative history to support Appellees5 argument
and Appellee has cited to none. Instead, Appellees criticize the reliance Appellant places
on Crabtree v. Woodman, 2008 WL 4276957, because Judge Tena Campbell failed to
address the "made at the time55 language in her analysis of Section 30-2-11(4). Contrary
to the arguments made at the trial court, Appellees seem to concede their issue that a loss
of consortium claim can be brought separately from the injured person's claim.
Appellees position now appears to be that because of the purposes of the Malpractice
Act, the injured person's spouse's loss of consortium claim must be included in the
injured person's notice of intent. Again, this argument rests of the assumption that the
Malpractice Act applies to Appellant's loss of consortium claim. It does not.
Similarly, Appellees criticizes Appellant's reliance on Huffer v. Kozitza, 375 N.W.
2d 480,482 (Minn. 1985), because in the Minnesota loss of consortium statute did not
contain the "made at the time" language or the procedural requirements similar to the
Malpractice Act. As Judge Campbell recognized when she relied upon Huffer in her
opinion in Crabtree, even though three and a half years had passed after Ms. Huffer
settled his injury claim, Mrs. Huffer, his former wife, was free to pursue her loss of
consortium claims. Judge Campbell recognized the right to bring an independent
outweighs the policy reasons to join loss of consortium claims with the injured person's
claims.
5

Courts are required to "assume that each term was used advisedly; and that each
[term] should be given an interpretation and application in accord with their usually
accepted meaning5'. See Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Utah
1971). Therefore, it is entirely plausible that the legislature chose the phrase "made at the
time" to accommodate alternate forums than the courts to prosecute malpractice disputes,
i.e. arbitration.
Furthermore, Appellees again blur the proceedings in the instant matter and Mrs.
Nordgren's private arbitration proceeding as it relates to when a loss of consortium claim
must be made. Mrs. Nordgren could not subject Appellant to the terms of the Dispute
Resolution Agreement. Therefore, Appellant had every right to file his Complaint before
the statute of limitations expired on his claims. Moreover, the Appellees received foil
notice of Appellant's claims when they received service of Appellant's Complaint.
(Blomquist Appellee Brief at 6, footnote, 2.)
HI.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT THE UTAH HEALTHCARE MALPRACTICE ACT
APPLIED TO APPELLANT'S LOSS OF CONSORTIUM CLAIM.
The trial court ruled that the procedural requirements contained in the Malpractice

Act applied to Appellant's loss of consortium claim. Appellees' argue that the Utah
Supreme Court has already recognized that the Malpractice Act applies to loss of
consortium claims derived from medical malpractice injuries. See Brower v. Brown, 114
P.2d 1337, n. 1,1338 (Utah 1987). Appellees reliance on Brower is misplaced The
issue addressed in Brower was whether the statute of limitation on Mrs. Brower's claim
for medical malpractice had run under the Malpractice Act. Although Mr. Brower had
6

made a loss of consortium claim, the Utah Supreme Court did not analyze Mr. Brower's
loss of consortium claim. Id. In fact, at the time that Brower was decided, Utah had not
recognized a cause of action for loss of consortium3.
A.

The plain language of 30-2-ll(4)(b) does not establish that Appellant's
loss of consortium claim is governed by the Malpractice Act

Appellees' argue that the plain language of 30-2-ll(4)(b) establishes that
Appellant's claim is governed by the Malpractice Act because it is "subject to the same
defenses, limitations, immunities, and provisions applicable to the claims of the injured
person." §30-2-1 l(4)(b). Appellees argued that because Mrs. Nordgren as the "injured
person" is subject to the Malpractice Act, then Appellant's loss of consortium claim is
thereby subject to the defense, limitations, immunities, and provisions contained in the
Malpractice Act. Id, Not only is Appellees' interpretation too simplistic, it also ignores
the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Bowling v. Sullen, 2004 UT 50, 94 P.3d 915.
In Dowling, the health care provider, Bullen, made almost the identical argument
urged that Appellees make when it urged the Utah Supreme Court to accept the

3

See also Hackford v. Utah Power & Light, 740 P.2d 1281, 1290 (Utah 1987).

Hackford was decided by the Supreme Court within months Brower. Notwithstanding
Justice Durham dissent outlining the wisdom of adopting a loss of consortium statute, the
Hackford Court declined to overturn previous rulings about the loss of consortium. In
fact the Court stated that "if any cause of action argued for by the appellant is to be
created anew in Utah, it should be done by the legislature." Id. at 1286-87.
7

proposition that the legislature intended for the Malpractice Act to have a broad scope4,
"as evidenced by the word 'any' in certain key provisions." 2004 UT 50, <ft 9. Instead,
the Supreme Court rejected Bullen's assertions and reasoned that because the legislature
limited the types of medical services that constitute "health care5" under the Malpractice
Act, it placed "undue weight on the comprehensive nature of the word 'any' and ignores
the subsequent limiting language..." Id. at 10.
Appellees, further argue that in order for the §30-2-11(4) to be interpreted in
harmony with the purposes of the Malpractice Act, service of a Notice of Intent must
constitute a "claim". See Blomquist Appellee Brief at 3. Appellees base this conclusion
on the assumption that the Malpractice Act applies to Appellant's loss of consortium
claims again because of the nature of Mrs. Nordgren's underlying medical malpractice
4

Had the legislature intended that all provisions of the Malpractice Act govern an

injured person's loss of consortium claim, the legislature would have noted this intention
in the plain language of the statute. This can be evidenced by the legislature's mandate to
limit a loss of consortium claim pursuant to the noneconomic restrictions of the
Malpractice Act. Section (7) reads that "damages awarded for loss of consortium, when
combined with any award to the injured person for general damages, may not exceed any
applicable statutory limit on noneconomic damages, including Section 78B-3-410. §302-11(7).
5

"Health care" is defined as only those services rendered by a health care provider "for,

to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or confinement."
U.C.A. §78b-3-403(10).
8

claims. Appellees yet again ignore the analysis in Dowling v. Bullen, wherein the Utah
Supreme Court explained that the Malpractice Act did not apply to every cause of action
involving the provision of health care services by a health care provider.. .doing so would
lead to absurd results. 2004 UT 50,ffif10-11.
B.
Since Appellant was not a "complaining patient", the procedural
requirements of the Malpractice Act do not govern Appellants9 loss of
consortium claim.
During oral argument before the trial court, Appellant's counsel argued that
Appellant's loss of consortium claim was not subject to the procedural provisions of the
Malpractice Act because Appellant's claim "relatfe] to or aris[e] out o f the health care
rendered to Mrs. Nordgren. See Dowling. (R. at 127(11-17). The trial court did not
mention Dowling in its Memorandum Decision. In Dowling, the Utah Supreme Court's
reasoning that in order for the Malpractice Act to apply, "the alleged malpractice must
"relat[e] to or aris[e] out o f health care rendered "for5 to or on behalf of a patient during
the patients' medical care, treatment, or confinement." Utah Code Ann. §78B-3403(10)6. Not unlike Dowling, Appellant is not the "complaining patient" and the
Malpractice Act does not control.
In their Briefs, Appellees were unable to successfully counter the applicability of
Dowling to the facts in this matter, so they both quickly disregarded7 it by arguing that

6

7

Previously codified as Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3(10).
Appellees Brown/Clinic cite the case of Darlington v. Willow Wood Care Center, 2006

UT App 370, for the proposition that all loss of consortium claims must satisfy the

9

Dowling did not apply because it involved the "direct tort" of alienation of affection and
not the derivative claim of loss of affection. See Blomquist Appellee Brief at 15 and
Appellees Brown/Clinic's Brief at 8. Both analyses fail. As argued at length above, the
"nominally derivative" nature of Appellant's loss of consortium claim does not
automatically subject it to the provisions of the Malpractice Act. See Hackford at 1290.
Furthermore, because he Mrs. Nordgren has not made a "claim" for it to be derivative to,
then Appellant's loss of consortium claim is, in fact, a "direct tort", which would make
the reasoning in Dowling is even more instructive, with competing case law or foil force
and effect in their Briefs, Appellees made slight mention of either discounted it claiming
that such application would ignore the derivative nature of a loss of consortium claim.
Appellant's loss of consortium claim should be analyzed under the holding in
Dowling. There is no contention that Appellees provided any care to Appellant. All care
was provided to Mrs. Nordgren, and Appellant's claims stem from that care. Therefore,
Appellant is not a "complaining patient" and the Malpractice Act does not apply to his
claims.

procedural requirements of the Act. This one-page Utah Court of Appeals decision was
unreported and did not analyze or even address how the Malpractice Act's procedural
formalities applied to loss of consortium claims and should therefore, be disregarded.

10

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court should hold that the trial court made reversible
errors when it dismissed Appellant's claim, and that Appellant filed a valid, timely claim
under Utah Code Ann. §30-2-11(4). Further, the Court should reverse the trial court's
decision and remand this case to the trial court so the Appellant can continue to prosecute
his claims.
DATED this 16th day of April, 2010.

DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

Craig G. Adkhsoft
Craig A. Hoggan
Debra Griffiths Handley
Attorneys for Appellant
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